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Abstract
The study of matching theory has gained importance recently with applications in Kidney
Exchange, House Allocation, School Choice etc. The general theme of these problems is to
allocate goods in a fair manner amongst participating agents. The agents generally have a unit
supply/demand of a good that they want to exchange with other agents. On the other hand,
Bochet et al. [7, 8] study a more general version of the problem where they allow for agents
to have arbitrary number of divisible goods to be rationed to other agents in the network. In
this current work, our main focus is on non-bipartite networks where agents have arbitrary
units of a homogeneous indivisible good that they want to exchange with their neighbors. Our
aim is to develop mechanisms that would identify a fair and strategyproof allocation for the
agents in the network. Thus, we generalize the kidney exchange problem to that of a network
with arbitrary capacity of available goods. Our main idea is that this problem and a couple of
other related versions of non-bipartite fair allocation problem can be suitablly transformed to
one of fair allocations on bipartite networks for which we know of well studied fair allocation
mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
The study of fair allocation on economic networks has gained a lot of importance in recent years
with growing applications in many public policy domains like fair exchange of kidneys among
patients [29], matching students to public schools [2], matching cadets in rotc [34] etc. The
common theme in all these problems is that participating agents are in supply/demand of a unit
indivisible good and the set of agents with whom they can share/recieve/supply this good is
modeled by a link. These problems identify fair and strategyproof allocation mechanisms for
agents in the network and thus is in very similar spirit of the classical marriage problem of Gale
and Shapley [18].
On the other hand, Bochet et al. [7, 8] study the problem of fair division of a maximum flow in a
capacitated bipartite network. This model generalizes and studies the exchange of divisible goods
on a economic networks where agents have arbitrary supply/demand constraints. Note that, the
aforementioned problems were typically unit supply/demand model. The common feature in both
these research is that the associated market is moneyless, so that fairness is achieved by equalizing
the allocation as much as possible. This last caveat is to account for additional considerations,
such as Pareto efficiency and strategyproofness, that may be part of the planner’s objective.
A well-studied special case of the Bochet et al. [7, 8] problem is that of allocating a single
resource (or allocating the resource available at a single location) amongst a set of agents with
varying (objectively verifiable) claims on it. This is the special case when there is a single supply
node that is connected to every one of the demand nodes in the network by an arc of large-enough
capacity. If the sum of the claims of the agents exceeds the amount of the resource available, the
problem is a standard rationing problem (studied in the literature as “bankruptcy” problems or
“claims” problems). There is an extensive literature devoted to such problems that has resulted
in a thorough understanding of many natural methods including the proportional method, the
uniform gains method, and the uniform losses method. A different view of this special case is
that of allocating a single resource amongst agents with single-peaked preferences over their net
consumption. Under this view, studied by Sprumont [35], Thomson [39] and many others, the
goal is to design a mechanism for allocating the resource that satisfies appealing efficiency and
equity properties, while also eliciting the preferences of the agents truthfully. The uniform rule,
which is essentially an adaptation of the uniform gains method applied to the reported peaks
of the agents, occupies a central position in this literature: it is strategy-proof (in fact, group
strategy-proof), and finds an envy-free allocation that Lorenz dominates every other efficient
allocation; furthermore, this rule is also consistent. A natural two-sided version of Sprumont’s
model has agents initially endowed with some amount of the resource, so that agents now fall
into two categories: someone endowed with less than her peak is a potential demander, whereas
someone endowed with more than her peak is a potential supplier. The simultaneous presence
of demanders and suppliers creates an opportunity to trade, and the obvious adaptation of the
uniform rule gives their peak consumption to agents on the short side of the market, while those on
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the long side are uniformly rationed (see [23], [6]). This is again equivalent to a standard rationing
problem because the nodes on the short side of the market can be collapsed to a single node. The
model we consider generalizes this by assuming that the resource can only be transferred between
certain pairs of agents. Such constraints are typically logistical (which supplier can reach which
demander in an emergency situation, which worker can handle which job request), but could be
subjective as well (as when a hospital chooses to refuse a new patient by declaring red status).
This complicates the analysis of efficient (Pareto optimal) allocations, because short demand and
short supply typically coexist in the same market.
As mentioned earlier, Bochet et al. [7, 8]. work with a bipartite network in both papers
and assume that each node is populated by an agent with single-peaked preferences over his
consumption of the resource: thus, each supply node has an “ideal” supply (its peak) quantity, and
each demand node has an ideal demand. These preferences are assumed to be private information,
and Bochet et al. [7, 8] propose a clearinghouse mechanism that collects from each agent only
their “peaks” and picks Pareto-optimal transfers with respect to the reported peaks. Further,
they show that their mechanism is strategy-proof in the sense that it is a dominant strategy for
each agent to report their peaks truthfully. While the models in the two papers are very similar,
there is also a critical difference: in [8], the authors require that no agent be allowed to send or
receive any more than their peaks, whereas in [7] the authors assume that the demands must be
satisfied exactly (and so some supply nodes will have to send more than their peak amounts).
The mechanism of Bochet et al.—the egalitarian mechanism—generalizes the uniform rule, and
finds an allocation that Lorenz dominates all Pareto efficient allocations. Later, Chandramouli
and Sethuraman [12, 11] show that the egalitarian mechanism is in fact strongly invariant, peak
and link group strategyproof: it is a dominant strategy for any group of agents (suppliers or
demanders) to report their peaks truthfully. Szwagrzak [36] studies the property of contraction
invariance of an allocation rule: when the set of feasible allocations contracts such that the optimal
allocation is still in this smaller set, then the allocation rule should continue to select the same
allocation. He shows that the egalitarian rule is contraction invariant. These results suggest that
the egalitarian mechanism may be the correct generalization of the uniform rule to the network
setting.
Our research is motivated by these results. From the results above, the generalized model
of allocation of divisible goods on bipartite networks is well understood. On the contrary, there
has not been a much focus in the litreature on fair mechanisms on non-bipartite networks. Our
contribution can be viewed in some sense a generalization of identifying a fair maximum matching
on general networks to that of identifying a fair maximum b-matching problem on non-bipartite
networks. Our contributions parallel the contribution of Bochet et al. [7, 8] in generalizing unit
capacity models.
Specifically, we are given a non-bipartite network G = (N,E), and we think of N as the set
of agents involved in this network. Each arc (i, j) ∈ E connects two participating agents and has
capacity uij ≥ 0. There is a single commodity (the resource) that is available at each node and
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needs to be exchanged with the neighbors on the network: we assume that node i has bi units of
the resource. The capacity of an arc (i, j) is interpreted as an upper bound on the direct transfer
from supply node i to demand node j. The agents derive utility whenever they exchange a good
with their neighbors. The goal is to find a maximum ”fair” exchange among participating agents
, while also respecting the capacity constraints on the arcs. We would describe in more detail our
model in the later sections. We describe below the connections of this model with litreature.
• Connection to Kidney Exchange Problem: The kidney exchange problem of [29] and
the subsequent heaavy litereature, study a unit exchange problem between patients who are
connected to their compatible donors through links in the network. Each agent needs exactly
one unit of good (in this case, kidney). Since, not every patient is compatible with everyone
else, we are naturally poised with the problem of not able to match every patient with his
compatible donor, hence the goal of the study is to identify maximum number of matches as
possible. In a combinatorics view, this problem can be viewed as one of finding a maximum
matching on a non-bipartite network. When the set of maximum matchings is not unique,
the mechanism designer is forced to pick one such maximum matching. From an economics
perspective, the mechanism designer would like to satisfy certain fairness objectives like
Lorenz Dominance, Pareto Optimality etc. and also incentive compatible conditions. Roth
et al. [29] construct the ”Egalitarian Mechanism” - which is a randomized lottery mechanism
over the set of maximum matchings. They identify a fair and strategyproof matching. As
described above, our problem is one in which each agent i, in the networks has arbitrary
units bi and derives utility with every exchange of that good with his/her neighbors in
the network. Since the goods are indivisible, our model generalizes the kidney exchange
problem to multiple demands and from a combinatorics perspective, generalizes to one one
of identifying a maximum b-matching on a non-bipartite network.
• Ordinal transportation problem: Ordinal transportation problem of Balinski and Yu [4],
study the problem of identifying a stable b-matching on bipartite networks. We differ from
their study in many ways. Our model is more general non-bipartite networks, our preference
structure is not ordinal (agents are indifferent from whom they recieve the goods from, the
utility structure is single peaked) and we are more interested in fairness notions like pareto
optimality and envyfreeness versus the notion of stability studied by Balinski.
Our Contributions; Our main contribution in this paper is a generalized egalitarian mecha-
nism that is Lorenz dominant, pareto optimal, envyfree and strategyproof for agents participating
in a non-bipartite network. We identify this in both the divisible and indivisible goods case. We
do so by transforming each of these non-bipartite networks to a suitable bipartite network. We
solve the fractional matching problem on this bipartite network and show how to construct a
lottery over integral b-matchings in the original network.
4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we consider the divisble goods case
and in Section 3 we consider the indivisble goods case. Finally in Section ??, we study extensions
to problems with capacities, weighted matchings and general s-t networks, non-pairwise exchange
Definitions:
Here we describe some of the common notions that are used in this paper. We are describing it
explicitly here because it is the same terminology that we use across our models.
Pareto Optimality: A feasible net transfer x as defined in the previous section is Pareto Optimal
if there is no other allocation x′ such that every agent is weakly better off and atleast one agent is
strictly better off in it. In mathematical terms, if Ri and Ii denote the preference and indifference
relations respectively for agent i, then
{∀ i : x′iRixi } =⇒ {∀ i : x
′
iIixi} (1)
Lorenz Dominance: A solution is Lorenz Dominant inside the pareto optimal set if for any
z ∈ RV , write z∗ for the order statistics of z, obtained by rearranging the coordinates of z in
increasing order. For z, w ∈ RV , we say that z Lorenz dominates w, written z LD w, if for all
k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n
k∑
a=1
z∗a ≥
k∑
a=1
w∗a
Lorenz dominance is a partial ordering, so not every set, even convex and compact, admits a
Lorenz dominant element. On the other hand, in a convex set A there can be at most one Lorenz
dominant element. The appeal of a Lorenz dominant element in A is that it maximizes over A
any symmetric and concave collective utility function.
No Envy: A rule x ∈ F(G, b, u) satisfies No Envy if for any preference profile R ∈ RS∪D and
i, j ∈ S such that xjPixi, there exists no x
′ such that
xk = x
′
k for all k ∈ S\{i, j}; for all l ∈ D and x
′
iPixi (2)
Strategyproof: A rule x on (G, b, u) is strategyproof if for all R ∈ RS∪D, i ∈ V and R′i ∈ R
xi(R)Rixi(R
′
i, R−i) (3)
2 Model 1: With preference indifference, divisible goods
In this section we consider the version of the problem where the nodes of the network are populated
by agents. Each node has a specific number of units of a particular good that they can exchange
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with the agents that they are connected with. Thus, our problem becomes one of exchanging a
single commodity among the set of agents V using the set E of edges.
An exchange of the commodity among the agents is realized by a b-matching f , which specifies
the amount of the commodity exchanged among the agents i and j using the edge (i, j) ∈ E. The
flow f induces an allocation vector for each agent as follows:
for all i ∈ V : xi(f) =
∑
j∈N(i)
fij; (4)
As we shall see in a moment, agents only care about their net transfers, and not on how these
transfers are distributed across the agents on the other side.
In the following sections, we assume that the peaks of the agents are fixed, and focus our
attention on mechanisms that elicit preferences from the agents on their connectivity and maps
the reported connectivity for each preference profile to a unique b-matching.
To summarize: agents arrive to the market with a specified number of divisible goods and
report the agents with whom they can have exchanges; They are preference homogeneous in the
sense that they are indifferent between whom they exchange. the allocation rule is applied to the
graph G with edge-capacities u, and the data b. Our focus will be on mechanisms in which no
agent has an incentive to misreport his compatible neighbors and also efficient.
Allocation Rules
We define an allocation on the edges as fab , ab ∈ E as feasible, if fab = fba ∀ab ∈ E and the
flow induced on the nodes by f (as x defined earlier) and for feasibility, xa ≤ ba ∀a ∈ V . Any
rule which picks an allocation from this set is called a feasible allocation rule. In the rest of the
section, we discuss the egalitarian rule for this model.
Given a network (G,N,E), we make the following transformation to construct the bipartite
network (Gb, Vb, Eb). We represent Vb = A ∪B where A = V and B = V . are either sides of the
network. There is an edge between agent i ∈ A and j ∈ B only if there is an edge ij in the given
network G. Connect the agents in A to a supply node s and the agents in B to a sink node t. We
refer to as a flow, any feasible shipment of goods from the source node to the sink node.
Lemma 1 Every feasible flow in the modified network Gb corresponds to a feasible allocation
(exchange) in the original network G. BIMS’s Egalitarian rule on the modified network Gb results
in a pareto optimal, lorenz dominance, envy free and peak strategy proof allocation for the agents
in the original network G.
Proof : Consider a solution (ya, yb, gab) for the agents in the modified bipartite network
where ya, yb refers to an allocation for agent a ∈ A and b ∈ B respectively. gab is the flow on the
edge ab. We will try to show that every feasible solution in the modified bipartite network maps
to a solution in the original network and vice-versa. Once we have that, the second part of the
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Figure 1: Transformation to bipartite network
statement follows (As Bochet et al. [7, 8] have established the fairness properties of egalitarian
mechanism in bipartite networks).
Firstly, consider a feasible exchange in the original problem. Denote the solution by (xa, fab)
for agent a, b in the network. x, f are node and edge allocations respectively. In the modified
network, set gaibj = gajbi = faiaj ∀i, j ∈ V . Clearly, this solution is feasible in the modified
network and yai = ybi = xai ∀i ∈ V .
Now, consider a solution (ya, yb, gab) in the modified bipartite network. Construct the following
solution, faiaj = (gajbi + gaibj )/2 ∀i, j ∈ V . This also defines a node allocation in the original
network with xai = (yai + ybi)/2 ∀i ∈ V . This is a feasible allocation since, fij = fji ∀ij ∈ E
and xi ≤ bi ∀i ∈ V .
Hence, the case of exchanging divisible goods in an economic network is done by a simple
transformation into a bipartite network. The mechanism is also peak strategyproof if the pref-
erence profiles are private information of the agents. In the next section, we discuss the case of
exchanging indivisible goods among agents in a network. We show that there is no mechanism
that is peak strategyproof but we design a mechanism which is egalitarian in nature and retains
many other attractive properties.
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3 Model 2: With preference indifference, Indivisible goods
In this section, we focus on allocation rules, which allows only integer allocations to the agents
in the network. To summarize: agents arrive to the market with a specified number of indivisible
goods and report the agents with whom they can have exchanges; They are preference homoge-
neous in the sense that they are indifferent between whom they exchange. the allocation rule is
applied to the graph G with edge-capacities u, and the data b. Our focus will be on mechanisms
in which no agent has an incentive to misreport his connectivity.
At this juncture, we would like to highlight an important difference with that of the bipartite
network structure here. The egalitarian rule of Bochet et al. [7, 8] constructs a fair allocation for
agents in a bipartite network with divisible goods. This rule is a generalization of the well known
Sprumont’s [35] uniform rule. On the other hand, when we are allocating a set of indivisible
goods among agents, Klaus et al. [17] proposed the probablistic uniform rule in the single agent
model. Their main contribution is the fact that there is no net utility loss for agents in both
divisible/indivisible models. The fractional part of an agents allocation (expected utility from
this mechanism) is the probability with which he has a claim on an extra unit of good.
Klaus et al. [17] mechanism is based on a simple idea that at each bottleneck point of the
Sprumont’s model, we randomize over all possible feasible allocations. Similarly, we define an
egalitarian mechanism for indivisible goods. The idea is to randomize over all possible feasible
flows at each bottleneck. The utility for the agents in the divisible goods case is same as the
expeced utility in the indivisible goods case.
This is not the case in non-bipartite networks. The net utility (sum total of utilities for all
agents) is not the same in divisible/indivisible goods case. For a simple example, consider a
traingular network with nodes (a, b, c) each with peak = 1; In the divisible goods case, a pareto
allocation would assign 1 unit to each node (0.5 units on each edge). The net social utility is
3units in this case. If the goods are indivisible, only 1 of the 3 edges can be picked in any maximal
allocation (pareto). The net social utility is 2units. In a fair allocation, we would pick each edge
with equal probability, giving an allocation of 2/3 for each agent. Hence, there is a clear gap in
the achievable utility between divisible and indivisible goods case in non-bipartite networks.
Hence, in this section we aim to identify an egalitarian mechanism for this model where the
agents arrive with indivisible goods. We reduce it to a suitable bipartite network and apply the
well-known fair allocation rules on this modified network.
Extensions of bipartite allocation rules: We note another property of the mechanisms which
would be different when we move to non-bipartite networks. ”Extension” is the property that
when we restrict ourselves to bipartite networks, the mechanisms that we construct should boil
down to the familiar fair allocation rules. Due to the ”utility gap” we discussed earlier, the divisible
and indivisible rules on non-bipartite networks would reduce to their respective counterparts on
bipartite networks. Though on bipartite networks the rules look similar, they need to be adjusted
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for the ”utility gap” when we move to non-bipartite networks. We would discuss this aspect in
further detail in later sections
b-matchings
b-matchings is a generalized notion of a matching type problems on networks. Given a network
G and a positive number bi for each node i ∈ V and capacity ue for each edge e ∈ E We define
the u-capacitated b-matching or (b,u) matching is a vector x such that
xi(f) ≤ bi for all i ∈ V (5)
0 ≤ fij ≤ uij for all ij ∈ E (6)
In the case when all the ue = ∞ and bi = 1, we arrive at the problem of finding a matching
in network G. The set of all x which satisfies [5] is the set of all feasible b-matchings. Clearly,
a given graph G can have more than one b-matching. From an operations research as well as
economics point of view we will be interested in finding the maximum b-matching among all
feasible b-matchings. Here, the maximum b-matching is the one with the highest
∑
i xi among
all the feasible b-matchings.
A maximum weight u-capacitated b-matching problem can be solved in strongly polynomial
time by a reduction to the maximum weight b-matching problem. Following is a linear program-
ming formulation of the maximum weight b-matching problem:
Max
∑
i
∑
j Xij (7)
subject to (8)
∑
j∈N(i)Xij ≤ bi ∀i ∈ V (G) (9)
Xij ∈ Z (10)
The maximum weight u-capacitated b-matching problem would encode the additional con-
straint Xij ≤ uij ∀ij ∈ E(G). In this section, we assume uij =∞ but we discuss the capacitated
case in later sections.
Algorithms for finding a maximum weight b-matching: Cook and Cunningham [15] discuss
polynomial algorithms to solve the b-matching problem. We briefly discuss about the b-matching
matroid. This discussion follows from the well-known matching matroid formulation. For details
on matching matroid, refer to cook [15].
For an undirected graphG(V,E) define, I = {xvec|xvec is the node allocation from some b-matching of G}
where xvec ∈ R
V , the ith component of the vector, xivec = xi where xi is the number of times
node i is matched in that particular b-matching. Then the pair, (V,I) := M is a matroid. We
will refer to it as the b-matching matroid. A base in M is a vector xvec that is generated by some
maximum b-matching of G.
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The ”rank” function : 2V → Z+ ∪ {0} of the matroid M is defined to be rank(S) =
maxI⊂S,I∈I |I| ∀ S ⊆ V . The rank function is submodular and in our context rank(S) can
be interpreted as the size of a maximum b-matching in the set S. Prank refers to the polymatroid
associated with this particular rank function and is given by
Prank = {x ∈ R
V |x ≥ 0, x(S) ≤ f(S), ∀ S ⊆ V } (11)
where x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi
From an Operations Research perspective, we have obtained an optimal solution to the max-
imum weight b-matching problem. But the aforementioned linear program can have many so-
lutions. From an Economics perspective, we would like to pick a particular maximum weight
b-matching from the optimal set such that the utility of the agents satisfy fairness constraints.
Inoder to find such an allocation, we would understand the structure of maximum weight b-
matchings for the uncapacitated problem in the rest of this section. Towards the end, we analyze
the case with capacities.
Pareto Optimality
A feasible allocation x ∈ A(G) is Pareto Optimal if for any other x′ ∈ A(G) we have
{for all i: x′iRixi} =⇒ {for all i: x
′
iIixi} (12)
i.e. there is no other allocation x′ that is weakly better for every agent and strictly better for
at least one agent in the allocation x.
Lemma 2 The set of pareto optimal allocations is equivalent to the set of maximum weight b-
matchings
Proof: If x denotes the utiliy profile of the agents in the network, then the size of the b-
matching that produced this utility profile is x/2. As each exchange between 2 agents on a
network adds an utility of one to each of those agents.
Suppose, we have an exchange of goods in the network that is produced by a maximum b-
matching resulting in the allocation profile x. Since, it is a maximum b-matching, we cannot have
more feasible exchanges in this network. There is no alternating path of odd length connecting
two unsaturated nodes. Any other path of even length from an unsaturated node a, to another
unsaturated node b will result in another maximum b-matching with the utility of node b strictly
below the current solution. Hence, picking any maximum b-matching to the problem should result
in an pareto optimal allocation for the agents.
Now, suppose x is a pareto optimal allocation for the agents in the network, then there exists
no allocation y in the network such that every agent is weakly better under allocation y, and
there is atleast one agent strictly better off under y. This implies, there is no alternating path
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of odd length connecting two unsaturated nodes. This implies the given solution is a maximum
b-matching.
The following generalization of Gallai and Edmonds theorem further helps us understand the
structure of pareto optimal solutions
Gallai - Edmonds Decomposition
Gallai and Edmonds decompose any given network into smaller sub-components namely, over
demanded, under demanded and pefectly demanded components. Bochet et al. [7, 8] use this
decmposition to establish the structure of pareto optimal allocations in bipartite networks. Roth
et al. [29] establish the structure of Pareto-efficient pairwise matchings using the Gallai-Edmonds
decomposition (GED). We generalize the GED idea to our problem where the nodes have arbitrary
peaks associated with them. Hence, we obtain a characterization of pareto efficient b-matchings
in this problem. M is the set of maximum b-matchings and let µ denote an arbitrary matching in
the set M , µ(i) denotes the matched neighbors of agent i in matching µ. Setting up the notation
partition V as {V U , V O, V P} such that
V U = {i ∈ V : ∃µ ∈M s.t. i ∈ µ(i)} (13)
V O = {i ∈ V \V U : ∃set of agents j˜ ∈ V Us.t.
∑
j∈j˜
ni,j = bi}, (14)
V P = V \(V U ∪ V O) (15)
where ni,j = 1 if i, j is matched in a feasible solution. V
U is the set of agents unmatched
(xi < bi) in atleast one maximum b-matching. V
O is the set of agents completely matched
(xi = bi) in every maximum b-matching and have atleast 1 neighbor in V
U . V P is the set of
agents who are again perfectly matched but does not have a link with any agent in V U .
Let I ⊆ V and N(I) = {j|ij ∈ E, i ∈ I}. Then (I,N(I)) is a reduced sub problem of the
original problem.
Lemma 3 Let I = V \V 0 and let µ be a pareto-efficient matching for the original problem (µ(i)
is the set of neighbors that is matched to an agent i), then
• For any agent i ∈ V 0, µ(i) ⊆ V U
• For any even comoponent (J,N(J)) such that J ⊆ V P and for any agent i ∈ J, µ(i) ∈ J\i
• For any odd comoponent J(‖J‖ >= 2), the maximum size of b-matching within every odd
comoponent is Σ
|J |
j=1bj − 1. Moreover, for any odd comoponent (J,RJ ), either
– one and only one agent i ∈ J is matched with a agent in V O under the pareto
efficient matching µ whereas all remaining agents in J are matched within so that
µ(j) ∈ J\{i, j} for any agent j ∈ J\{i} or
11
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Figure 2: GED of a non-bipartite network with arbitrary peaks; In this figure, {s6, s7} ∈
V O, {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s8} ∈ V
U , {s9, s10, s11, s12, s13, s14, s15} ∈ V
P
– one agent i ∈ J remains unsaturated under the Pareto-efficient matching µ whereas all
remaining agents in J are saturated so that mu(j) ∈ J\{i, j} for any agent j ∈ J\i
Proof : The Gallai-Edmonds decomposition precisely proves the above lemma when all the
peaks bj = 1. Roth et al. [29] which this paper builds upon has a statement when the nodes
have unit capacity. Now, lets construct a matching instance of the given b-matching problem.
From the given graph (G,V,E) construct the following graph (G′, V ′, E′): Create bi duplicate
copies of node i with unit peak each. Label these nodes as (i1, i2....ibi). In the graph G′, nodes
ik, (k ∈ 1, 2, ..bi) and j
l, (l ∈ 1, 2, ..bj) is connected by an edge if ij is conencted in the original
graph G. There is no edge between ik and ir, (k, r ∈ (1, 2, ...bi)) in G
′. Now, we have a graph
with unit peaks. Applying the GED on this unit graph would establish the result.
We just stress a bit on the third statement. When (|J | = 1) the odd component has only
1 element, then there is no b-matching within that component. When |J | >= 2, we highlight
that the maximum size of any matching within every odd component in a unit capacity graph is
one less than the number of nodes in the component (refer to Roth et al. [29] for a proof). By
symmetry, all the duplicate (identical) copies of a node will be in the same component. Hence,
we can shrink these duplicate nodes into the parent node with original peak. Thus, from the
decomposition above, the sum of the peaks of the agents in a odd component is Σ
|J |
j=1bj and the
result follows.
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Allocation Rules
Utility Profile:
A utility profile U ∈ RV is said to be a feasible utility profile if the profile is an outcome of a feasible
b-matching in the network. Since, we are looking for pareto optimal solutions, the outcome of
our mechanisms is an utility profile induced by a maximum b-matching in the network.
A mechanism is deterministic if for a given network, it picks a maximum b-matching as an
outcome from the set of maximum b-matchings. Roth et al. [29] study priority mechanisms in the
context of deterministic mechanisms. They also show establish that the randomized ”Egalitarian”
mechanism is superior in the sense that it not only retains the efficiency, strategyproof properties
of deterministic mechanism, but it also produces an outcome which is envy free and strongly
efficient in the sense of lorenz dominance. The mechanism of Roth et al. is a ”lottery” mechanism,
that randomly picks a maximum b-matching from the pareto optimal set. The distribution or
lottery is chosen in such a way that the aforementioned economic properties are exhibited by the
mechanism. We define this more mathematically below.
Lottery Mechanism:
Let U be the set of all b-matchings in G. A matching lottery l : Pµ, µ ∈ M is a probability
distribution over U . For each matching µ ∈ U , Pµ, µ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of choosing
matching µ in lottery l, and
∑
µ∈U Pµ = 1. A matching lottery l can be also viewed as a fractional
b-matching which
is defined to be a convex combination of several integral b-matchings. Let L be the set of
matching lotteries. Given l ∈ L, define the utility xli of vertex i to be the expected total exchanges
that i is involved , i.e., xli =
∑
µ∈U lµx
µ
i . Define the utility profile induced by lottery l to be the
vector xl = (x
l
i), i ∈ V . Let P = xl, l ∈ L be the set of all feasible utility profiles.
Egalitarian Mechanism: Description and Properties
It is now clear from our definition that a feasible utility profile can be understood as a fractional
b-matching (a convex combination of integral b-matchings). The Prank polymatroid we defined
earlier is exactly the set of feasible utility profiles.
Roth et al. [29] described the Egalitarian Mechanism for the pairwise kidney exchange prob-
lem. Jianli et al. [1] develop a water filling algorithm which gives a simpler and intuitive proof
of the Roth’s mechanism. Here, we use the ideas from jianli et al. to develop an Egalitarian
Mechanism for the generalized maximum indivisible exchange problem. The idea is similar in the
sense that the problem on a general network can be suitably reduced to a problem on a bipartite
network. This can be done if one could establish the equivalence between the solutions in both
network. Once the above step is completed, we could run the familiar allocation rules for bipartite
networks to establish a allocation for our original general network. We describe this procedure
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below in more detail
Step 1: Transformation to equivalent bipartite network: We construct the following two sided
bipartite flow network. The left side of the bipartite network consists of nodes for each agent i.
Construction of Nodes: Define C = {C1, C2....Ck} as the set of odd components in the under-
demanded component V U where k = |C|. Construct the following bipartite graph GB = (A,B,E)
where each node in A corresponds to a node in V . We use AC1 , ..., ACk to denote k disjoint sets
corresponding to C1, C2, ..Ck respectively. Let A
PO = {ai|i ∈ V
P ∪NO}; AU = {ai|i ∈ V
U}.
The construction of B is as follows. B Can be partitioned into 3 parts: BPO ∪ BO ∪ BC .
Each node in BPO corresponds to a node in BP ∪ BO. We use ci ∈ B
PO to denote the node
corresponding to i ∈ BP ∪BO. Each node in BP corresponds to a node V P . We use c′i ∈ B
O to
denote the node corresponding to i ∈ V P . BC consists of k disjoint sets BC1 , BC2 ....BCk , where
BCi contains a node with value Σj∈Cibj − 1 (this is the maximum b-matching within a particular
odd component) if and only if |BCi | ≥ 2; BCi is empty otherwise.
Construction of Edges:
(1) For each i ∈ V P ∪ V O, we have edge (ai, ci) ∈ E where ai ∈ A
PO and ci ∈ B
PO
(2) For a vertex ai ∈ A
C and another vertex c′j ∈ B
O we have (ai, c
′
j) ∈ E if (i, j) ∈ E
(3) For each vertex, a ∈ ACi add an edge to the node in BCi .
Step 2: Apply the egalitarian mechanism (BIMS): Apply the Egalitarian Mechanism for indi-
visible goods in a bipartite network.
Step 3: Construct a randomized mechanism: lottery over b-matchings: The egalitarian mecha-
nism outcomes a fractional utility profile for the agents. From theorem 1 later, it is clear that
such a utility profile is actually feasible and can be generated as a lottery over integral maximum
b-matchings. Every time, we generate a maximum b-matching with this probability profile and
conduct exchanges on the network.
Example: Consider the original network as given in figure 2, the bipartite transformation out-
lined in step 1 is shown in figure 3. When the egalitarian mechanism is applied to this bipartite
network, we get the following utility profile for the agents: Every agent i ∈ V P ∪ V O receive
their allocation = peak. The agents s1, s2, s3 receive 2 units of utility each. The utility of agents
s2, s4, s5 is
7
3 each. This fractional utility is obtained as a lottery over integral b-matchings. In
this case, 2 units of agents s4, s5 is always exchanged with agent s6. s2 has to exchange 2 units
within its odd component in every maximum b-matching. Agents s2, s4, s5 compete for the extra
unit of exchange that s6 can do. The egalitarian mechanism picks any of the possibility with a
probability of 13 .
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Figure 3: Transformation into bipartite network of the original graph in figure ??; ai refers to
node si
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Egalitarian Mechanism: Linear Programming Approach
1) Step 1. Solve the linear program LP1
Maximize λ1
subject to
xv = λ1,∀v ∈ V, x ∈ Prank
We call an element v ∈ V a tight element if xv participates in some tight constraint in Prank. Let
D1 be the set of tight elements. In other words, increasing xv would violate some constraint in
Prank when other xu for u 6= v are fixed. In many linear programming algorithms, we can easily
detect such tight elements. Another way to test the tightness of an element is to solve a closely
related linear program in which we fix other xu and maximize xv.
(2) In general, at Step k, we solve the linear program
LPk = maximize λk, subject to xv = λj, ∀ v ∈ Dj ∀ j < k,
xv = λk,∀v ∈ V \ ∪j<k Dj , x ∈ Prank.
Let Dk be the set of elements that become tight in this step.
(3) The algorithm return x = xv = λj for v ∈ Dj if ∪
k
j=1 Dj = V
Lemma 4 Every feasible maximum flow on the modified bipartite network is equivalent to a feaible
utility profile in the original network
Proof: A utility profile in the original network is induced by a maximum b-matching µ or a
lottery (linear combination) over the set of maximum b-matchings. Also, it is well known that the
polytope of maximum flows is convex with integral extreme points. Hence, to prove that every
utility profile in original network implies a feasible maximum flow in the modified network, it is
sufficient to prove the statement only for integral utility profiles (as every deterministic maximum
b-matching corresponds to a integral utility profile). Now, given this maximum b-matching, we
will match it to a unique maximum flow, f in the modified network. Since each agent i ∈ NP ∪NO
is saturated, send flow fij = bi on all edges ij, i ∈ A
PO, j ∈ BPO. Now, focus on each component
Ck, if Ck has only one node i with utility Ui. Then this utility is derived only by exchanging
with the agents in BO
′
. Send a flow, fij = xij ∀ij such that j ∈ N(i) ∩ B
O′ where xij is the
number of units exchanged between agents i and j in the given maximum b-matching. On a
similar note, we fix the flow for the other components Ck. We know in any Ck, |Ck| − 1 of the
vertices are matched in the same component, so a flow of |Ck| − 1 can be obtained by sending
xij units of flow to the agents in B
Ck . If ij ∈ µ, i ∈ V C and j ∈ V O, then node i is saturated in
that particular b-matching; If we send a unit flow in modified network, it is also saturated in the
bipartite network.
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To prove the other direction that every integral maximum flow corresponds to a feasible utility
profile in the original network. Consider a maximum flow of |F | in the modified bipartite network.
First lets say the maximum flow value is |B|, this is also the size of the maximum b-matching in the
original network. For a given set ACi with |ACi | >= 2, there is at most one vertex aj ∈ A
Ci such
that there exists a vertex c′h ∈ B
O with f(aj, c
′
h) = 1.In this case, we include in the matching µ.
In any maximum flow, for each Ci, agents in A
Ci send |Ci|− 1 units of flow to B
Ci . Consequently
from GED lemma, |Ci| − 1 vertices can be matched among themselves. There are exactly |V
O|
units exchanged by agents in AC with agents in V O. each such exchnge constitutes one unit flow
to BO. So all vertices in V O are matched. From GED Lemma, we can match all vertices in V P
among themselves in µ. It is easy to see that u is exactly the utility profile corresponding to µ.
Theorem 1 Once we have this, then we can find the lottery mechanism by solving an LP - linear
combination of extreme points
Proof: From the lemma above, we have showed that every maximum flow in the modified
network is equivalent to a maximum b-matching induced utility profile in the original network.
The egalitarian allocation outputs a maximum flow allocation (not necessarily integral). But it is
folklore that this non-integral maximum flow can be obtained as a convex combination of integral
maximum flows. These convex combinations λ are the probabilities with which we pick different
matchings from the set of all maximum b-matchings.
Lorenz Dominance & No Envy
As discussed in Klaus [17], No envy and ETE are not equivalent here. From theorem above, the
egalitarian mechanism applied to this bipartite network is a feasible utility profile. Bochet et
al. [8] have established the egalitarian mechanism is lorenz dominant among all feasible flows. No
Envy also follows from the allocation rule of Bochet et al. [7, 8]
Extensions and Consistency
Extension of Rules: In the language of Moulin and Sethuraman [27], an allocation rule φ on a
bipartite network (G,V,E) is said to be an extension of the Sprumont’s Uniform rule if φ coincides
with the allocation of uniform rule if G is a network with unit demander (supplier) connected to
multiple suppliers (demanders). i.e.
φi = Ui, ∀ i ∈ V (16)
where Ui is the utility of agent i under uniform rule.
The notion of ”extending a rule” is such that we are not compromising on properties of existing
fair allocation mechanisms. Instead, we are actually generalizing in a suitable way to more general
network structures.
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In this spirit, Bochet et al. [7, 8], Chandramouli and Sethuraman [12, 11] develop mechanisms
which are extensions of the uniform rule. Moulin and Sethuraman [27] study a more general
class of extensions of some basic well known rules. We extend this definiton further to general
non-bipartite networks. An allocation rule x on a general network (G,V,E) is said to be an
extension of the BIMS Egalitarian rule φ if x coincides with φ if the network G is bipartite i.e.
xi = φi, ∀ i ∈ V
Lemma 5 The egalitarian rule described earlier for non-bipartite networks is a extension of the
probabilitic egalitarian rule (described in appendix) for bipartite networks
Proof: If the network is bipartite, the odd components set, V U forms an independent set.
So, V U is a collection of nodes (with peaks bi) which are not saturated in atleast one maximum
b-matching. Hence, the set BU is empty and each agent i ∈ V U is only connected to agents in
V O who are completely saturated. In the bipartite context, if i were a supplier then, any agent
j ∈ N(i) has xj = bj in all pareto allocations. For a detailed derivation of GED for bipartite
networks, follow the discussion in Chandramouli and Sethuraman [12]. It is clear from their proof
that if the given network G is bipartite, then the Step 1 of our algorithm which modifies the given
network into a suitable bipartite network, outputs G. Since, we apply the probabilistic egalitarian
rule in step 2, the result follows.
Consistency: As discussed in Chandramouli and Sethuraman [11], the egalitarian rule is an
extension of the uniform rule which is not consistent. They propose the edge fair rule which is a
consistent extension of the uniform rule to bipartite networks. In the previous section, if after the
transformation into bipartite network, if we apply the edge fair mechanism to that network, we
would have a consistent extension of the uniform rule to non-bipartite indivisible goods network.
Strategic Issues
Peak Strategyproofness
In the discussions so far, we have ignored the possibility of agents having control over the values
bi. Suppose agents report bi to the mechanism designer who then decides the final allocation,
then the agents can misreport the peaks to improve their allocation. So far, the allocation of the
agents was strictly less than bi. If the agents report b
′
i > bi, then there is a possibility of agents
having an allocation more than his true bi. In that case, we need assumptions on the preference
profile of agents to compare his utilities when his allocations are on either side of his true peak
bi.
Single peaked preferences: In the spirit of Bochet et al. [7, 8], we would like to continue
our assumption of single peaked preferences for the agent allocations. Mathematically, given a
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prefernce profile Ri for agent i and two possible allocations xi, x
′
i then:
x′i < xi ≤ p[Ri] =⇒ xiPix
′
i (17)
p[Ri] ≤ xi < x
′
i =⇒ xiPix
′
i (18)
A mechanism is peak strategyproof if it is a dominant strategy for the agents to reveal their
peaks truthfully. Given this preference structure, the following example shows that there is no
peak strategyproof mechanisms in the set of pareto optimal allocations. Consider agents (a, b, c)
connected to each other and peak bi = 1, i ∈ (a, b, c). If the agents report their true peaks, then
any allocation mechanism is such that {(xa, xb, xc)|xa + xb + xc ≤ 2}. W.l.o.g, lets say xa < 1.
Suppose agent a misreports his peak ba = 2, then we have a unique maximum b-matching and
the allocation is (2, 1, 1). If 2Paxa for agent a, he improves his allocation.
Link Strategyproofness
A mechanism is link strategyproof if it is dominant strategy for the agents to reveal all his/her
neighbors. Roth et al. [29] established the link strategyproofness of the egalitarian mechanism in
the kidney exchange problem. The egalitarian mechanism is not link group strategyproof even in
the kidney exchange problem. To see that, consider the following network where each node has 1
unit of good to exchange. Agent s4 is matched in every maximum matching, but s7 is missed in
some maximum matching and recieves a utility strictly less than 1 in the egalitarian allocation.
Now, s4, s7 can coordinate and misreport about the existence of the link between s4 and s3. If
that link is not reported, then, (s4, s5, s6, s7) form a separate group and all the agents are matched
and receive peak utility. Hence, agent s7 improves his allocation.
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
Weak link groupstrategyproof: A mechanism is weakly link group strategyproof if in a coali-
tional group, every agent who misreports about his connectivity strictly improves his/her alloca-
tion.
The agents in over demanded and perfectly demanded component doesn’t misreport since
they already recieve their peak allocation. The only deviating subsets are those agents in the odd
components. Hence, for the rest of the proof we restrict our attention to coalition groups which
consists only of agents of the odd components.
Theorem 2 The egalitarian mechanism is weakly link groupstrategyproof
Proof. We prove the result for an arbitrary coalition of agents. Let Ai be the set of agents
that agent i is linked to, and let A′i be agent i’s report. We may assume without loss of generality
that any given agent ∈ V PO finds all the agents in odd components acceptable: if even component
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agent j finds add component agent i unacceptable, then agent i cannot have a link to demander j
regardless of his report, so clearly i’s manipulation opportunities are more restricted. Let φ and
φ
′
be (any) egalitarian flows when the suppliers report A and A′ respectively, and let x and x′ be
the corresponding allocation to the agents. We show that no coalition of odd component agents
can weakly benefit by misreporting their links unless each agent in the coalition gets exactly their
egalitarian allocation.
Consider the transformed bipartite network of the given network when going through the
analysis below:
The proof is by induction on the number of type 2 breakpoints in the algorithm to compute
the egalitarian allocation in the transformed network. Suppose the given instance has n type 2
breakpoints, and suppose X1,X2, . . . ,Xn are the corresponding bottleneck sets of suppliers. If
n = 0, every odd component agent is at his peak value in the egalitarian allocation, and clearly
this allocation cannot be improved. Suppose n ≥ 1. Define
X˜ℓ = {i ∈ Xℓ |
∑
j∈Ai
φ′ij ≥
∑
j∈Ai
φij},
and
Xˆℓ = {i ∈ Xℓ |
∑
j∈Ai
φ′ij ≤
∑
j∈Ai
φij}.
We shall show, by induction on ℓ, that for each ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n:
(a) φ
′
ij = 0 for any i ∈ X˜ℓ′ , j ∈ ∪i′∈XℓAi′ , ℓ
′ > ℓ; and
(b) Xℓ ⊆ Xˆℓ.
The theorem follows from part (b) above.
Any supplier k ∈ Xℓ \ X˜ℓ must have Ak = A
′
k as otherwise supplier k is part of the deviating
coalition and does worse. Consider now a supplier i ∈ X˜ℓ with xi < si and a supplier k ∈ Xℓ \ X˜ℓ.
We have the following chain of inequalities:
∑
j∈A′
k
φ
′
kj =
∑
j∈Ak
φ
′
kj <
∑
j∈Ak
φkj = xk ≤ xi =
∑
j∈Ai
φij ≤
∑
j∈Ai
φ
′
ij ≤
∑
j∈A′i
φ
′
ij.
To see why, note that as k ∈ Xℓ \X˜ℓ, the second inequality is true by definition, and also Ak = A
′
k
(justifying the first equality). Also k, i ∈ Xℓ and xi < si, implies xk < si, as suppliers k and i
both belong to the same bottleneck set and supplier i is below his peak; this justifies the third
inequality. The fourth and fifth inequalities follow from the fact that i ∈ X˜ℓ and the fact that φ
′
ij
must be zero for all j ∈ Ai \A
′
i. This chain of inequalities implies that x
′
k < xk ≤ sk and x
′
k < x
′
i.
Therefore, when the suppliers report A′, supplier k must be a member of an “earlier” bottleneck
set than supplier i. An immediate consequence is that demanders in A′k = Ak do not receive any
flow from supplier i when the report is A′.
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By the induction hypothesis, supplier i ∈ Xℓ does not send any flow to the demanders in
∪1≤i′≤ℓ−1 ∪k∈X
i
′ Ak′. Therefore
{j | φ
′
ij > 0, j ∈ Ai} ⊆ {j | φij > 0, j ∈ Ai}.
This observation, along with the fact that every i ∈ X˜ℓ weakly improves, and the fact that Xℓ
is a type 2 breakpoint implies that
∑
j∈Ai
φ
′
ij =
∑
j∈Ai
φij , establishing (b). Furthermore, in
such a solution, every demander j ∈ Ai for i ∈ X˜ℓ must receive all his flow from the suppliers in
X˜ℓ.In particular, the demanders in Xℓ cannot receive any flow from suppliers in Xℓ′ for ℓ
′ > ℓ,
establishing (a). To complete the proof we need to establish the basis for the induction proof, i.e.,
the case of ℓ = 1. This, however, follows easily: it is easy to verify that the set X1 \ X˜1 must be
empty, so X1 = X˜1. As X1 is a type 2 bottleneck set, it is not possible for every member of X1
to do weakly better unless the allocation remains unchanged. Thus, both (a) and (b) follow.
3.1 Arbitrary Capacity
4 Conclusion
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5 Appendix
5.1 Indivisible exchange on bipartite networks: Probabilistic Egalitarian Rule
We fix a problem (G, s, d) such that si, dj > 0 for all i, j (clearly if si = 0 or dj = 0 we can ignore
supplier i or demander j altogether). We define independently our solution for the suppliers and
for the demanders.
The definition for suppliers is by induction on the number of agents |S| + |D|. Consider the
parameterized capacity graph Γ(λ), λ ≥ 0: the only difference between this graph and Γ(G, s, d)
is that the capacity of the edge σi, i ∈ S− is min{λ, si}, which we denote λ∧si. (In particular, the
edge from j to τ still has capacity dj). We set α(λ) to be the maximal flow in Γ(λ). Clearly α is
a piecewise linear, weakly increasing, strictly increasing at 0, and concave function of λ, reaching
its maximum when the total σ-τ flow is dD+ . Moreover, each breakpoint is one of the si (type 1),
and/or is associated with a subset of suppliers X such that
∑
i∈X
λ ∧ si =
∑
j∈f(X)
dj (19)
Then we say it is of type 2. In the former case the associated supplier reaches his peak and so
cannot send any more flow. In the latter case the group of suppliers in X is a bottleneck, in the
sense that they are sending enough flow to satisfy the collective demand of the demanders in f(X)
and these are the only demanders they are connected to; any further increase in flow from any
supplier in X would cause some demander in f(X) to accept more than his peak demand.
If the given problem does not have any type-2 breakpoint, then the egalitarian solution ob-
tains by setting each supplier’s allocation to his peak value. Otherwise, let λ∗ be the first type-2
breakpoint of the max-flow function; by the max-flow min-cut theorem, for every subset X satis-
fying (19) at λ∗ the cut C1 = {σ} ∪X ∪ f(X) is a minimal cut in Γ(λ∗) providing a certificate of
optimality for the maximum-flow in Γ(λ∗). If there are several such cuts, we pick the one with the
largest X∗ (its existence is guaranteed by the usual supermodularity argument). The egalitarian
solution obtains by setting
xi = min{λ
∗, si}, for i ∈ X
∗, yj = dj , for j ∈ f(X
∗),
and assigning to other agents their egalitarian share in the reduced problem (G(SX∗,Df(X∗)), s, d).
That is, we construct ΓSX
∗,Df(X∗)(λ) for λ ≥ 0 by changing in Γ(G(SX∗,Df(X∗)), s, d)
the capacity of the edge σi to λ ∧ si, and look for the first type-2 breakpoint λ
∗∗ of the corre-
sponding max-flow function. An important fact is that λ∗∗ > λ∗. Indeed there exists a subset
X∗∗ of SX∗ such that ∑
i∈X∗∗
λ∗∗ ∧ si =
∑
j∈f(X∗∗)f(X∗)
dj
If λ∗∗ ≤ λ∗ we can combine this with equation (19) at X∗ as follows
∑
i∈X∗∪X∗∗
λ∗ ∧ si ≥
∑
i∈X∗
λ∗ ∧ si +
∑
i∈X∗∗
λ∗∗ ∧ si =
∑
j∈f(X∗∪X∗∗)
dj
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contradicting our choice of X∗ as the largest subset of S− satisfying (19) at λ
∗.
Once the λ is obtained the probabilistic egalitarian rule is obtained similarly to the prob-
abilistic uniform rule of Klaus et al. and Moulin []. The trick here is to randomize at each
bottleneck. Now, without loss of generality, let X¯ = {i ∈ X∗∗|p(Ri) ≥ xλ + 1} = {1, 2...., n¯} and
N˜ = {i ∈ N |p(Ri) ≤ xλ} = {n¯ + 1, ..., n}. Then in the final allocation we obtain, each agent in
N˜ receives his peak amount and each agent in N¯ receives either xλ or xλ +1. Note that for each
i ∈ N¯ , (xλ + 1)Pixλ and that exactly n¯(λ − xλ) agents in N¯ can receive xλ + 1. The random-
ized ”lottery” places equal probability on all allocations where all agents in N˜ receive their peak
amounts, n¯(λ− xλ) agents in N¯ receive xλ +1 and the remaining agents in N¯ receive xλ. Hence,
the utility profile is obtained by placing equal probabilities on exactly () allocations.
If p(Ri ≤ xλ, then Ui(R)(p(Ri)) = 1 and if p(Ri) ≥ xλ + 1, then Ui(R)(xλ + 1) = λ − xλ
and Ui(R)(xλ) = 1− (λ− xλ) The solution thus obtained recursively is the egalitarian allocation
for the suppliers. A similar construction works for demanders: We consider the parameterized
capacity graph ∆(µ), µ ≥ 0, with the capacity of the edge τj, j ∈ D set to µ ∧ dj . We look for
the first type-2 breakpoint µ∗ of the maximal flow β(µ) of ∆(µ), and for the largest subset of
demanders Y such that ∑
j∈Y
µ ∧ dj =
∑
i∈g(Y )
si
etc.. Combining these two egalitarian allocations yields the egalitarian allocation (xe, ye) ∈ RS∪D+
for the overall problem.
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